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PERSECUTION IN THE FOG OF WAR:
THE HOUSE OF LORDS' DECISION IN ADAN
Michael Kagan*
William P. Johnson**
Of all the words in the international refugee definition,' "for reasons
of' are possibly the most forgettable. Yet these three words are leading
some courts and tribunals to deny asylum to people at risk of the most
serious human rights violations when committed in the context of civil
war.
International law requires that a refugee have a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group It is not enough to be at
risk of being persecuted, nor is it even enough to be a member of a particular race or religion. There must be a "nexus" between the danger and
one of the five Convention-recognized reasons for persecution. In the
1998 decision in Adan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,3
the House of Lords concluded that a man fleeing clan warfare in Somalia
could not meet the nexus test. The House of Lords did not doubt that the
man was at risk of serious harm at the hands of a rival clan, but the Lords
nonetheless declined to recognize his claim. Because Adan and other
members of his clan were found to face no greater danger than members
of other clans, he could not convince the Lords that the risk to him was
for reasons of clan identity (a form of race or nationality). The decision
shows how the interpretation of three simple words can determine
whether people who escape from the world's most vicious wars will be
protected as refugees.
In this Article, we argue that the House of Lords' reasoning in Adan
was seriously flawed. The House of Lords correctly recognized that evidence that minorities face a heightened risk of being persecuted can be
*
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University in Cairo and legal adviser to the Musa'adeen refugee aid initiative in Cairo, Egypt.
** William P. Johnson (J.D. Michigan 2001) is a law clerk to Justice Russell A. Anderson of the Minnesota Supreme Court. The authors are grateful to the other student participants
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1. A refugee is any person who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling

to avail himself of the protection of that country .... " Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. l(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
2. Id.
3. Adan v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] 1 A.C. 293, [1998] 2 W.L.R. 702,
[1998] 2 All E.R. 453 (H.L. 1998).

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 23:247

sufficient to show a nexus to a Convention ground. Yet it erred when it
went on to hold that only differentially at-risk individuals or groups can
benefit from refugee status. If a person's risk of being persecuted is
causally linked to his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion, the nexus requirement is
satisfied irrespective of whether the applicant is a member of a minority
group that is particularly vulnerable to harm.
1. Factual Assumptions
Hassan Hussein Adan fled Somalia with his wife and children in
1988. Adan belonged to both the Isaaq clan and the Habrawal sub-clan.
He first applied for asylum in the United Kingdom in 1990.
In 1991, Somalia's President Siad Barre fell from power, leaving the
country with essentially no government. After Barre's government dissolved, the Hawiye clan massacred many members of other clans in
Mogadishu, including members of Adan's Isaaq clan. In the mid-1990s,
the Isaaq became the dominant clan in the self-proclaimed independent
region of Somaliland. The Habrawal sub-clan has generally backed
Muhamed Ibrahim Egal as president of Somaliland.4 Very little of this
factual context appears in the Lords' decision.! The House of Lords
showed a reluctance to explore individual complexities, simply adopting
the view that "every group seems to be fighting some other group or
groups in an endeavour to gain power,, 6 as Lord Slynn wrote in his concurring opinion.
A Special Adjudicator had initially determined that Adan demonstrated a well-founded fear of being persecuted by "members of the
armed groups or militias of other clans or alliances"7 that battled for position in Somalia. However, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT)
determined

4.

See generally U.S.

COUNTRY CONDITIONS

DEP'T OF STATE, SOMALIA: PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND

(2000); Danish Immigration Service (Udloendinge Styrelsen), Report

on Minority Groups in Somalia: Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya (Dec. 2000) at http://www.udlst.dk/udlst-engelsksjlel /somaliaengOO/inhold.html;
Ken Menkhaus, U.N. High Comm'r on Refugees, Somalia: A Situation Analysis, Writenet
Paper 07/2000 (2000) at http://www.reliefweb.int.
5. Adan tried to argue that he faced a particularly heightened risk because the Habrawal
had recently attacked a rival sub-clan, which threatened vengeance. Without explanation, Lord
Lloyd resisted exploring the implications of this possibility. He ruled: "I do not consider that
this throws doubt on the IAT's conclusion that all sections of society in northern Somalia are
equally at risk so long as the civil war continues." Adan, [1999] I A.C. at 312 (per Lloyd,
L.J.).
6. Id. (per Slynn, L.J.).
7. Id. (per Lloyd, L.J.).
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[t]hat fighting and the disturbances are indiscriminate and that
individuals from all sections of society are at risk of being
caught up therein, and that the situation is no worse for members
of the Isaaq clan and the Habrawal sub-clan than for the general
population and the members of any other clan or sub-clan.
In light of this finding below, Lord Lloyd began his analysis in the lead
opinion for the House of Lords with the following question:

Can a state of civil war whose incidents are widespread clan and
sub-clan-based killing and torture give rise to well-founded fear
of persecution for the purposes of the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol thereto, notwithstanding that the individual
claimant is at no greater risk of such adverse treatment than

others who are at risk in the civil war for reasons of their clan
and sub-clan membership? 9
The Lords decided two issues in Adan. The first concerned whether

showing past persecution alone can satisfy the "well-founded fear of being persecuted" requirement. When he originally applied for asylum
after arriving in Britain in 1990, Adan said he feared persecution by the
Somali Government. This government had fallen a year later. The Lords
clarified that refugee status determination centers on future risks, which
set up the question for which the decision is most significant: did Adan
satisfy the nexus requirement of the refugee definition? This article deals
only with this second issue.
2. Can There be a Risk of "Persecution" in a Civil War?
Lord Lloyd, and Lord Slynn in shorter form, first explained the standards that most often apply in refugee law, and then distinguished those
standards from cases arising from civil war.'0 Lord Lloyd acknowledged
8. Quoted in Court of Appeals Judgment, Adan v. Secretary of State for the Home
Dep't, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1107, [1997] 2 All E.R. 723 (Eng. C.A.), 2 B.H.R.C. 65, [1997] Imm.
A.R. 251, [1997] I.N.L.R. 1.
9. Adan, [1999] 1 A.C. at 308, (per Lloyd, L.J.) (emphasis added).
10. The House of Lords also indicated that it sees civil wars as unique in R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C.
629, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1999). This decision broadened the
understanding of persecution and made clear that women fleeing domestic violence can be
protected by the Refugee Convention. While recognizing the claims of women who flee beatings and rapes by men in their own families, Lord Hoffmann excluded women who flee
beatings and rapes in wartime:
Assume that during a time of civil unrest, women are particularly vulnerable to attack by marauding men, because the attacks are sexually motivated or because they
are thought weaker and less able to defend themselves .... It may be true to say
that women would not fear attack but for the fact that they were women. But I do
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that normally a person may be a refugee if he or she faces group-based
persecution. He agreed that, were it not for the civil war, a Somali could
win refugee status recognition on the basis of a risk confronting his or
her clan, even though this could allow large numbers of claimants." Yet
Lord Lloyd found it "unappealing" that in a civil war, combatants on
both sides could be refugees while those "lucklessly endangered on the
sidelines" could not. 2
Lord Lloyd arrived at "the conclusion that fighting between clans
engaged in civil war is not what the framers of the Convention had in
mind by the word 'persecution.'" Both judgments in Adan stressed the
inapplicability of normal standards of refugee law in a case of clan warfare. 3 The Lords would not have required Adan to do more than meet the
usual refugee definition had Somalia not been in a state of civil war.
Lord Slynn explained:
[T]he individual in the group does not have to show that he has a
fear of persecution distinct from, or over and above, that of his
group. Thus if in a state two groups exist, A and B, and members
of group A threaten to or do persecute members of group B the
latter should, other necessary matters being established, be able
to claim refugee status. If at the same time members of group B
are persecuting or threatening to persecute members of group A
the claim should be the same. The position is even stronger if the
persecution is not exactly simultaneous but those in power
change from time to time so that the persecutors become the
persecuted. Looking, however, at the language of the Convention
and its object and purpose I do not consider that it applies to
those caught up in a civil war when law and order have broken
down and where, as in the present case, every group seems to be

not think that they would be regarded as subject to persecution within the meaning
of the Convention. The necessary element of discrimination is lacking.
Id. at 654 (per Hoffmann, L.J.).
1I.Adan, [1999] 1A.C. at 308 (per Lloyd, L.J.). "[Mr. Pannick for the Home Secretary]
accepts further that the persecution of individuals and groups, however large, because of their
membership of a particular clan is very likely to be persecution for a convention reason." Id.
12. Id. (quoting Simon Brown, L.J. in Adan, [1997] 2 All E.R. at 735).
13. It is not entirely clear whether Lords Lloyd and Slynn had the same reasons for thinking that civil wars pose special problems. Lord Slynn said he looked at the language, context,
and purpose of the Convention to reach his conclusion, but did not explain what he had found.
He seemed to be troubled most by the chaos of civil war, when "every group seems to be
fighting some other group or groups." Adan, [1999] 1A.C. at 302. Lord Lloyd, also without
explanation, concluded that the drafters of the Convention did not expect it to apply to "both
sides" in a conflict. Id. at 308. Despite these differences, both judgments hold that there is a
special test for civil war cases because civil wars pose special problems.
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fighting some other group or groups in an endeavour to gain
power.
Lord Lloyd extrapolated that if the war in Somalia ended with one
clan clearly in charge, people like Adan might be able to meet the Convention definition: "If the vanquished are oppressed or ill-treated by the
victors, they may well be able to establish a present fear of persecution
for a Convention reason."' 5
Lord Lloyd was correct that the Refugee Convention requires a distinction between persecution and "the ordinary incidents of civil war."' 6
But in our view he was mistaken to conclude that "fighting between
clans engaged in civil war"' 7 cannot constitute persecution for reasons of
clan identity. Fleeing from civil war alone is not enough to meet the
Convention definition, but in some circumstances war-related violence
can give rise to a valid claim to refugee status.
The House of Lords seems to have been led astray by ambiguous
statements in some of the leading treatises and summaries of refugee
law, which (if taken out of context) suggest there is something special
about civil war claims that raises the standard for refugee recognition.
These statements in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook, James Hathaway's treatise, and the European
Union's 1995 Joint Position agree that fleeing a civil war does not, on its
own, make someone a Convention refugee. For example, the UNHCR
Handbook says "[p]ersons compelled to leave their country of origin as a
result of international or national armed conflicts are not normally considered refugees under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol .... ""
James Hathaway's treatise includes a similar statement: "[I]t was not
intended that all those displaced by violent conflict should enjoy refugee
status."' 9 The same can be said of the European Union's Joint Position on
the Definition of the Term "Refugee,, 20 which Lord Lloyd also cited.
14. Id. at 302 (per Slynn, L.J.).
15. Id. at 311 (per Lloyd, L.J.).
16. Id. at 308 (per Lloyd, L.J.).

17. Id.
18.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK

ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE
VENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 39, 1

[hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
19. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE

LAW OF REFUGEE

STATUS

1951 CON164 (1979)

185 (1991) [hereinafter

HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS].

20.
Reference to a civil war or internal or generalised armed conflict and the dangers
which it entails is not in itself sufficient to warrant the grant of refugee status. Fear
of persecution must in all cases be based on one of the grounds in article IA of the

Geneva Convention and be individual in nature.
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While the sections of these sources relied on by Lord Lloyd say that
fear of exposure to civil war does not per se give rise to refugee status,
they do not say that civil war violence can never be the basis of a Convention refugee claim. On close examination, there is actually consensus
among the sources cited by the House of Lords that civil war claims
should be judged on the same standards as all other refugee claims.2 As
Guy Goodwin-Gill explains:
The fact of having fled from civil war is not incompatible with a
well-founded fear of persecution in the sense of the 1951 Convention. Too often, the existence of civil conflict is perceived by
decision-makers as giving rise to situations of general insecurity
that somehow exclude the possibility of persecution."
Moreover, while Lord Lloyd cited one sentence of the UNHCR
Handbook, he did not discuss the UNHCR's clearer and more recent position on civil war refugees set out in the 1995 Information Note on
Article I of the 1951 Convention, which explains:
[T]here is nothing in the definition itself which would exclude
its application to persons caught up in civil war ....[M]any
conflicts take place against a political background which may
involve serious violations of human rights, including the targeting of particular ethnic or religious groups."
Nor did he discuss the 1998 conclusions of the UNHCR Executive
Committee, which express "deep concern about the increasing use of
war and violence as a means to carry out persecutory policies against
groups targeted on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion."24

Joint Position of The Council of the European Union Defined by the Council on the Basis
of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the Harmonized Application of the
Definition of the Term "Refugee" in Article I of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951
Relating to the Status of Refugees 12105/95, para. 6, 1996 O.J. (L. 63) 5, (cited in Adan,

[1999] 1 A.C. at 310, per Lloyd, L.J.) (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g.,

HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS,

supra note 19, at 185-88 (Hathaway writes,

"[wihile the general proposition is that the victims of war and violence are not by virtue of
that fact alone refugees, it is nonetheless possible for persons coming from a strife-torn state
to establish a claim to refugee status,"). See also G.S. GOOOWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-76 (2d ed. 1996); UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 18,1 164.
22. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 75. See also U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Information Note on Article I of the 1951 Convention, 5 [hereinafter UNHCR Information
Note] availableat www.unhcr.ch.
23. UNHCR Information Note, supra note 22, 5.
24. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees Executive Comm. Conclusion No. 85 (XLIX), Conclusion on International Protection, I c (1998) [hereinafter EXCOM Conclusion No. 85]
available at www.unhcr.ch.
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International law requires that a treaty's interpretation be governed
by analysis of its text, context, and purpose." A treaty's drafting history
is relevant to confirm the text, context, and object and purpose, to resolve ambiguity, or to prevent a "manifestly absurd or unreasonable"
result. 26 Aside from citing treatises and the UNHCR Handbook, the
House of Lords engaged in very little examination of the text, context,
and object and purpose of the Refugee Convention. Lord Lloyd asserted,
without explanation, that the Convention's framers did not have civil war
in mind. In fact, the drafting history confirms that war and violence can,
in some circumstances, produce valid refugee claims. As Hathaway argues, "the Refugee Convention was conceived as a response to the
victims of war.' 27 In one of the early refugee law treatises, Nehemiah
Robinson also describes the background to the Convention in a way that
suggests that victims of wars precipitated the drafting of the Refugee
Convention:
The great changes in the political and social structure in Europe,
which principally followed in the tidal wake of the cataclysmic
breakdown of the centuries-old Russian and Turkish empires, resulted in a mass exodus of persons who were refugees from the
new regimes. They were mostly Russians and Armenians, whose
total figure amounted to a million persons. The later establishment of the Fascist regime in Italy resulted in tens of thousands
of Italian refugees while the Civil War in Spain added hundreds
of thousands of Spanish refugees. The creation of the Nazi regime in Germany and the occupation by Nazi Germany of other
regions-the Saar, Austria, Sudetenland and the Protectorateresulted in a new wave of refugees."'
The proposals offered during the drafting of the refugee definition
show that the delegates clearly understood that the new Convention
would embrace war refugees. It is true that the drafting Committee rejected the definition proposed by the United States, which would have
explicitly included as refugees those persecuted on account of one of the
Convention grounds, or who belonged to one of several named categories of war victims, 29 adopting instead a general definition open to a
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331,340, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
26. Id., arts. 31(1), 32.
27. HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19, at 185.
28. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES-ITS
HISTORY, SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTENTS, I (Institute of Jewish Affairs, World Jewish Congress
1952).
29. U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, United
States: Memorandum on the Definition Article of the PreliminaryDraft Convention Relating
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variety of circumstances. ° But delegates gave no indication at all that
war refugees should be excluded from this general definition. Indeed, the
Israeli representative at the 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries carefully noted that fleeing hostilities alone is not enough "unless they were
otherwise covered by Article 1 of the Convention."3 ' This qualification
shows that the drafters conceived that people who flee hostilities could
be Convention refugees under at least some circumstances.
3. The Nexus Problem
Why, then, did the House of Lords conclude that Mr. Adan was not a
refugee? For Lord Lloyd, the problem presented in Adan's case was not
really so much an issue of whether or not harms faced in context of civil
war could amount to "persecution," but rather whether the risk of harm
could be said to be "for reasons of' a Convention ground. "What then is
the critical factor which distinguishes persecution from the ordinary incidents of civil war?" he asked. 3' The answer, he determined, is the
absence of differential impact:
In a state of civil war between clans an asylum seeker must be
able to show that he is at greater risk of ill-treatment than other
members of his clan3 ....

In other words, he must be able to show fear of persecution for
Convention
reasons over and above the ordinary risks of clan
35
warfare.

to the Status of Refugees (and Stateless Persons) (EIAC. 3212) at 1-2, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.4

(1950).
30. U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 6th mtg.,
at 2, U.N. Doc E/AC.32/SR.6 (1950).
The Chairman [of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems]

observed that the Committee had to decide whether the definition of the term 'refugee' ... should be confined to general terms or whether it should be a detailed
statement of the various categories of refugees to whom the convention would apply.
Id.
31. United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and State-

less Persons at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONE2/SR.22, at 6 (1951) (Statement by Mr. Robinson of
Israel).
32. See IVOR C. JACKSON, THE REFUGEE CONCEPT IN GROUP SITUATIONS 76 (1999).
33. Adan v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1999] I A.C. 293, 308 (per Lloyd, L.J.),
[1998] 2 W.L.R. 702, [1998] 2 All E.R. 453 (H.L. 1998).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 311 (per Lloyd L.J.).
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Lord Lloyd relied extensively on Hathaway's treatise,36 which argues
that "the mere fact that the conflict escaped is based on religion or politics is not relevant unless persons of a particular religion or political
perspective are differentially at risk."37 Since the Immigration Appeal
Tribunal had concluded that Somalis belonging to all or most clans were
all equally at risk, Lord Lloyd found that Adan was not a refugee." However, Lord Lloyd did not articulate the differential risk comparison as
advocated by the sources upon which he relied. Lord Lloyd appeared to
require Adan to show risk above that faced by other members of his own
clan.3 9 The approach outlined by Hathaway would have only required
Adan to show that his clan was more at risk than the general population)0 This is a critical distinction to make, since a refugee may be
persecuted for reasons of his or her group identity, so that the risk of persecution may be equally high for all members of a particular religious or
racial group.
The nexus requirement has been difficult to interpret in part because
it has not always been clear to courts why it exists. While there is little
doubt that the "for reasons of' clause delimits the beneficiary class of
persons able to show a well-founded fear of being persecuted, there is
considerable disagreement about the principled basis for the
delimitation. One way of understanding the nexus requirement is to
suppose that only members of minority groups are eligible for refugee
status. In this view, refugees must have a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of minority status, understood in terms of
marginal political, social, and economic power.4 ' The logic behind the
"minority protection thesis" is that the Convention was designed to
provide surrogate protection for those who have been fundamentally
disfranchised from their national community: "[Tlhe beneficiaries of
refugee law have always been defined to exclude those who enjoy the
36.

HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19.
37. Id. at 187.
38. Adan, [1999] 1 A.C. at 312 (per Lloyd, L.J.).
39. Lord Lloyd explained: "He must be able to show what Mr. Pannick calls a differential

impact. In other words, he must be able to show fear of persecution for Convention reasons
over and above the ordinary risks of clan warfare." Id. at 311 (per Lloyd, L.J.). Earlier, as
explained by Lord Lloyd, Mr. Pannick had argued for the Secretary of State that "[iun a state
of civil war between clans an asylum-seeker must be able to show that he is at greater risk of

ill-treatment than other members of his clan. There must, he said, be a differential impact." Id.
at 308.
40. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19, at 185-87.
41. See U.N. ESCOR, I1th Sess., 158th mtg., at 13, U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.158 (1950).
42. Hathaway has argued this as a proper understanding of the delimitation. See James C.
Hathaway, Is Refugee Status Really Elitist? An Answer to the Ethical Challenge, in EUROPE
AND REFUGEES:

A CHALLENGE? 79 (Jean-Yves Carlier and Dirk Vanheule eds., 1997) [here-

inafter, Hathaway, Is Refugee Status Really Elitist?].
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basic entitlements of membership in a national community . . . ."" By
this analysis, the nexus component of the Refugee Convention definition
requires fundamental marginalization or disfranchisement of a minority
group in a way that distinguishes its members from other persons at risk
of being persecuted. 4 However, the minority protection approach carries
significant risks. Requiring that refugee status be reserved for
marginalized minority groups can easily lead to a mistaken insistence
that the minority group in question must face a greater risk of being
persecuted than other minority groups. This error by the House of Lords
in Adan amounts to a requirement that the particular group to which the
applicant belongs be 'targeted' or 'singled out' for persecution. The
reasoning in Adan leaves open the possibility that when multiple groups
in a state are persecuted, none might quality for refugee status because
none can show a differential impact.
It is important also to ask whether there is a good reason to construe
the Refugee Convention's "for reasons of" clause as limiting refugee
status to the members of minority groups. Approached from an abstract
ethical or empirical basis, there may indeed be good reasons for delimiting refugee status based on minority protection.4 ' For example, Clair
Apodaca recently presented empirical data demonstrating that "[tihe sectors of the population singled out for human rights violations are often
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. 46 She also states that "human
rights abuses provide the immediate impetus for refugee flight. 4 7 The
logic of the minority protection thesis infers a relationship between these
observations, reasoning that because minorities are most likely to be
marginalized by those in power, minority status is an ethical and logical
way to interpret the delimitation implicit in the nexus requirement.

43. HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19, at 135. Atle Grahl-Madsen and Deborah Anker support this analysis of the Convention's membership principle. Grahl-Madsen
first articulated the connection between refugees and their national community when he wrote
that "[iut is characteristic of the situation of political refugees that the normal mutual bond of
trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance between an individual and the government of his
home country has been broken (or simply does not exist) ..... I ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (1966). Anker further developed this concept, stating that "the refugee is fundamentally marginalized; she is unable to enjoy basic
rights or vindicate them through change or restructuring from within her society." DEBORAH
ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES

267 (1999).

44. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19, at 135.
45. See Hathaway, Is Refugee Status Really Elitist?, supra note 42, at 79-88. "[T]he lack
of a meaningful stake in domestic governance that frequently distinguishes minorities from
others in the society of origin does give a particular urgency to their need to seek asylum
abroad." Id. at 86.
46. See Clair Apodaca, Human Rights Abuses: Precursor to Refugee Flight?, II J. REFUGEE STUD. 80, 85 (1998).
47. Id. at 80.
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Application of the minority protection thesis to interpret the Convention's nexus requirement nonetheless poses practical difficulties for
decisionmakers. These difficulties can result in inconsistency within and
among jurisdictions and risk the rejection of legitimate refugee claims
for reasons attributable to a simple misunderstanding of who actually is a
minority. There is a great deal of debate about what makes a group a minority. Observers at the U.N. Working Group on Minorities recently
recognized that the definition of "minority" is constantly evolving, such
that it might never be possible to produce a consistent meaning of the
term.48 Consequently, there are varying and competing definitions of
"minority," and these variations lead to confusion in applying the minority protection thesis. Francesco Capotorti has fashioned a definition of
"minority" from the case law of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, government proposals, and discussions within the Human Rights
Committee. For purposes of Article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),49 Capotorti defines minorities as
groups
that are numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a
State; that are in a non-dominant position; whose membersnationals of the State of residence-possess ethnic, religious or
linguistic characteristicsdiffering from those of the rest of the
population; and that show-if only implicitly-a sense of solidarity, directed toward preserving their culture, traditions,
religion or language.' °
Capotorti's definition, however, differs from that advanced by
proponents of the minority protection thesis in refugee law who do not
focus on numerical inferiority and group solidarity. Capotorti's
definition, if used to inform the minority protection thesis, would
dramatically restrict the class of persons fleeing civil war who would
qualify for asylum. While the minority protection thesis in refugee law
defines "minority" in broader terms, focusing on exclusion from power,
48. Prevention of DiscriminationAgainst and the Protection of Minorities:Report of the
Working Group on Minorities on its Sixth Session, U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 8,
34, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/27 (2000).
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
50. Capotorti proposed the definition in a study commissioned by the United Nations
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. FRANCESCO
CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND

568, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/Sub.2/384/Rev. I, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV. 1
(1999) (emphasis added). This definition has achieved the most widespread recognition in
regard to Article 27 of the ICCPR. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITILINGUISTIC MINORITIES

CAL RIGHTS:

CCPR

COMMENTARY

487 (1993).
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regardless of numbers,' this special meaning is not always recognized
by courts attempting to apply the approach. A related practical difficulty
is that decisionmakers may bring preconceived notions to the concept of
minority that impair their ability to utilize it equitably in determining
refugee status. There is a further risk that a decisionmaker may project
his or her moral judgment onto a minority group, valuing some groups
over others by refusing to recognize a group as a minority group.
Equally important, as a matter of law, there are reasons to doubt the
salience of the minority protection thesis. A close examination of the
text, context, and objects and purposes of the Refugee Convention reveals that limiting refugee protection to minority groups would be
inappropriate. The term "minority" does not appear anywhere in the text
of the Refugee Convention, as it does in the ICCPR and other human
rights instruments. Justice Wilcox's opinion in the Australian decision
Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs v. Abdi neatly summarizes the argument against reading a delimitation based on minority
status into the Refugee Convention:
[O]nce it is established that a person is at risk of being killed or
tortured in a war by reason of clan membership, in circumstances where that is one of the objectives of the war, one might
properly ask what further degree of danger or exposure needs to
be established before the required nexus with a Convention reason is made out? Given the purpose of the Convention ... it is
difficult to see the reason why a 'second tier' of 'differential' or
super-added persecution should be imposed on an applicant for
refugee status .... There is no basis for the imposition of this
additional requirement of differential treatment either in the language or objectives of the Convention.
The Convention requires only that a risk of being persecuted be for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of
a particular social group. To demand also that a person be a member of a
minority group would, in effect, amount to the creation of an additional
exclusion clause in the Convention.
The drafting history of the Convention also argues against the minority protection approach. Early refugee treaties named specific groups of
5 1. For example, both definitions agree that white South Africans are not a minority
group because, despite their numerical inferiority, they are in a dominant political, economic,
cultural, and social status. However, the definitions diverge for black South Africans. According to the minority protection thesis in refugee law, black South Africans are a minority group
because of their non-dominant position. Yet, by Capotorti's definition their numerical superior-

ity precludes them from being called a minority, even under the oppression of apartheid.
52. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Abdi, (1999) 162 A.L.R. 105,
115-16 (Austl.).
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at-risk minorities 3 International instruments of that era were addressed
to the needs of specifically named, at-risk groups, all the members of
which were entitled to claim refugee status). During the drafting of the
1951 Refugee Convention, however, proposals to continue the practice
of identifying refugees by naming specific minority groups were
rejected.55 In particular, the United States' proposal to include those who
were persecuted on account of one of the Convention grounds, or who
belonged to one of the enumerated categories of groups based on their
ethnicity or nationality, was ultimately rejected.56 Even if the drafters had
the protection of minorities in mind-and in fact most of the discrimination they knew was discrimination against minorities-they did not take
the affirmative step to limit refugee status to minorities.
4. The Relevance of "Differential Impact"
Establishing that a refugee applicant's political, ethnic, or social
group faces a differential risk provides circumstantial evidence that the
claimant's civil or political status contributes to his or her risk "of being
persecuted." Differential impact is useful to uncover a nexus between the
asylum seeker's predicament and a Convention ground when a
persecutor gives no direct indications of motive but the abuse falls
disproportionately on a minority or some other group.57 Evidence of
differential risk may be sufficient to establish nexus, but it is not legally
53. See generally RoBINSON, supra note 28. These named minority groups included,
among others, people of Russian origin with political convictions fundamentally at odds with
the ruling Bolsheviks, Armenians settled in Turkey, Assyro-Chaldeans who had fled Greece,
Ruthinians who had fled Galicia, Montenegrins living in France, and Jews living in Bukowina,
Bessarabia, and Transylvania. See James C. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in
InternationalLaw: 1920-1950, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 348, 350-55 (1984).
54. Hathaway identifies three phases of development of the international refugee definition that precede the Refugee Convention. The first phase (1920-35) reflects a juridical
perspective, in that the refugees were identified by their membership in a group of persons
effectively deprived of state protection. The second phase (1935-39) embodied a social perspective, reflecting a social approach to the refugee definition, which helped both defacto and
de jure victims of loss of state protection. The third period (1938-50) marked a significant
change in the concept of refugee that reflected an individualist approach in what Hathaway
calls the individualist perspective. HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19, at 2-6.
55. See Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, supra note 30.
56. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
57. UNHCR provides this guide:
It is appreciated ... that many conflicts take place against a political background,
which may involve serious violations of human rights, including the targeting of
particular ethnic or religious groups. In a situation of internal armed conflict, the
aims of the warring parties, including a government's need to protect itself, do not
justify the use of indiscriminate shelling or bombardment, torture or arbitrary punishment against certain sectors of the population. Such acts may be considered,
therefore, as giving rise to refugee status under the 1951 Convention.
UNHCR Information Note, supra note 22,

8.
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required in all cases. When direct evidence is available that a persecutor
chooses victims for reasons of a Convention ground, there is no reason
to ask for circumstantial evidence as well.
Yet, to decide whether a risk of being persecuted was "for reasons
of' a Convention ground, the House of Lords in Adan relied exclusively
on differential impact analysis. Only with such an absolutist analytical
approach could the Lords have concluded that Adan was at risk of "clanbased killing," but not at risk of being persecuted for reasons of clan
membership. In using differential risk as the one and only test of nexus
in a civil war case, the Lords relied upon a misreading of Hathaway's
treatise. While the Lords used differential impact as the sole test for
nexus, Hathaway would have alternatively allowed Adan to show that
violence was directed at his particular social subgroup, though all Somalis might suffer from the same degree of violence." Hathaway's
formulation of differential impact in civil war cases developed from a
statement by the Israeli delegate during the drafting of the Convention
explaining that the Convention requires differential victimization: "The
text ... obviously did not refer to refugees from natural disasters, for it
was difficult to imagine that fires, flood, earthquake or volcanic eruptions, for instance, differentiated between their victims on the grounds of
race, religion, or political opinion."59 Following this statement, the real
focus is whether there is evidence of "differential victimization," which
may be demonstrated by differential risk, differential impact, or otherwise.
Differential victimization is substantially broader than differential
impact. It includes situations where one race is more at risk than other
races-in other words, cases of differential impact. But it also includes
situations where the agent of persecution differentiates between victims,
choosing to inflict harm for reasons of race. Thus, as Hathaway explains,
"persons may be differentially at risk where the civil war or violence is
directed at a particular social subgroup."' This would include cases
where clan militias target the members of rival clans, because the militias differentiate between their victims, even if clan warfare is so
widespread that nearly every person is at risk.

58. HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19, at 187-88 (advocating a comparison
with the general population, not with the claimant's own group).
59. U.N. GAOR, CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES, supra note 31 (Statement by Mr.
Robinson of Israel) (emphasis added); see also HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19,
at 185.
60. HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 19, at 187.
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5. Civil War Claims After Adan
Even courts that have tried to follow the alternative approach of the
Adan decision have in practice avoided applying the most flawed aspects
of its reasoning. For example, in R. (on the application of Duman) v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judge Collins reached the
following conclusion:
[Adan] made it clear that there must be a Convention basis for
the persecution that exists, so that, for example, people caught
up in a civil war, who suffer, not because of anything political or,
on any other Convention ground, but merely because they happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, are not entitled
to the protection of the Geneva Convention. 6
Similar reasoning was invoked to refuse the refugee claim of a Sierra
Leonean in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte
Sourbah.2 The court rejected the suggestion that the general situation in
Sierra Leone justified refugee status, even though "butchery and other
outrages" were occurring in the country." While relevant, that was not
enough by itself to qualify for refugee status anybody who did not wish
to return to Sierra Leone: "[T]he question is not simply whether there is
a fear or a well-founded fear, but whether there is a well-founded fear of
persecution for a Convention reason." 64 The court then explained Adan's
holding as a rule that civil war alone is not enough:
The existence of civil unrest or civil war in a country does not in
itself qualify those who have left the country, such as the applicant, for refugee status ....

[Adan] shows clearly that the existence of civil unrest and even
atrocities in Sierra Leone cannot in itself establish the existence
of refugee status on the part of an applicant. An applicant must

61. R. (on the application of Duman) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2001]
E.W.C.H. Admin. 168 110, CO/2908/00 (Q.B. 2001). The court in Duman was considering
the application of a claimant from Turkey who was of Kurdish ethnicity and an Alevi Muslim.
Id. para. 1. The court drew a distinction between situations where the state is unwilling to
prevent persecution and situations where it is unable to prevent persecution, when the persecution is committed by non-state actors. Id. $ 9-10. The court found that it is not always easy
(but not necessarily impossible) to establish in such circumstances that any persecution that

occurs is for a Convention reason and cited Adan to support that proposition. See id.
62. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Sourbah, [1999] Imm. A.R. 452,
CO/3754/97 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1999).
63. Id. at 455.
64. Id.
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still show that he has a well-founded fear of persecution for a
Convention reason. 65
British courts have thus viewed Adan as a simple reiteration of the rule
that civil war alone is not enough to win refugee status.
While minority protection is one means of advancing the linkage between the "for reasons of' clause and non-discrimination law,66 an
alternative approach is to read the nexus clause as extending protection
to all persons at risk because of a protected characteristic, whether or not
they are members of a minority group, and whether or not singled out.
This alternative is referred to as a 'simple impact' approach. Unlike the
minority protection thesis, which requires a comparison between the
claimant's risk and that faced by the overall population, the simple impact approach is non-comparative. It requires only a link between the
claimant's predicament and a Convention ground.
Many governments, decisionmakers, and the UNHCR have
embraced a simple impact approach. This is consistent with recognizing
that minority groups are not the only people targeted for discriminatory
harms for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group
membership, or political opinion.67 In the specific context of civil war
65. Id. at 456. The court acknowledged that Adan requires that in situations of civil war
an applicant must show fear of persecution for a Convention reason over and above the ordinary risks of clan warfare, or at least over the ordinary risks of whatever civil unrest there
existed in the country. Yet the court did not rely on the absence of differential impact to deny
the application, and concluded by stating that the findings on credibility were "ultimately
decisive of the case."
66. See R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1999).
Lord Hoffmann explained:
[I1n the context of a human rights instrument, discrimination means making distinctions which principles of fundamental rights regard as inconsistent with the right of
every human being to equal treatment and respect.
It is because [the nexus grounds] are either immutable or part of the individual's
fundamental right to choose for himself that discrimination on such grounds is contrary to principles of human rights.
Id. at 651.
67. One recent example is the civil war in former Yugoslavia. Before the war, the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was almost equally divided among Roman Catholic Croats, Muslim Bosnians, and Orthodox Bosnian Serbs. The war was fought with the help of Serbia and
Croatia, but the balance of power was not always dramatically tilted against the Bosnian Muslims. In 1992, the Bosnian Army, composed mostly of Muslims, was joined by the
paramilitaries of Bosnian Croats. Ulrike Davy, Refugees From Bosnia and Herzegovina: Are
they Genuine?, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 53, 58 (1995). However, this dynamic
changed throughout the war. Bosnian Serbs could flee to Serbia, and Croats could flee to
Croatia, but there is evidence that refugees were turned away from both places, despite their
ethnic and religious affinity. There is also evidence of an agreement between the Croat and
Serb leaders to split Bosnia between them.
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claims, governments, courts, and the UNHCR have suggested that the
background or purpose of the civil conflict may provide the required
evidence of nexus to a Convention ground. This approach has been most
comprehensively advocated in the Canadian Guidelines on Civilian NonCombatants Fearing Persecution and related case law. The Canadian
Guidelines reinforce the use of a non-comparative approach, citing
Salibian v. Canada (Ministerof Employment and Immigration):
A situation of civil war in a given country is not an obstacle to a
claim provided the fear felt is not that felt indiscriminately by all
citizens as a consequence of the civil war, but that felt by the applicant himself, by a group with which he is associated, or, even,
by all citizens on account of a risk of persecution based on one
of the reasons stated in the definition.68
The Federal Court of Australia's decision in Abdalla v. Ministerfor
Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs echoes this approach: "Much will
depend on the purposes for which the war is being fought. For example,
if it is fought to eliminate or punish members of another clan, it may
amount to 'persecution' for a Convention reason. 69 Similarly, the
UNHCR Executive Committee recognizes that some wars are conducted
as a means of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.7 °
For future courts to avoid the pitfalls of the Adan case, decisionmakers need a clear understanding of exactly how the nexus requirement
delimits the refugee definition. The House of Lords helpfully endorsed
differential impact as one way to meet the requirement, but there is no
sound legal basis for making it the sole test of nexus. The words "for
reasons of' should instead be understood to require only that there be
some link between the risk of being persecuted, and race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.
As framed in the Michigan Guidelines7 on Nexus to a Convention
Ground:
A fear of being persecuted is for reasons of a Convention ground
whether it is experienced as an individual, or as part of a group.
68.

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, CIVILIAN NON-COMBATANTS FEAR-

IN CIVIL WAR SITUATIONS (March 7, 1996), available at http://
www.irbc.cn. See also Salibian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1990] 3
F.C. 250.
69. Abdalla v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 1017 F.C.A.,
51 A.L.D. 11 (Austl.).
70. EXCOM Conclusion No. 85, supra note 24.
ING PERSECUTION

71. James C. Hathaway, Michigan Guidelines on Nexus' to a Convention Ground, 23
MIcH. J. INT'L L.

207, 210 (2002).
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Thus, evidence that persons who share the applicant's race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion are more at risk of being persecuted than others
in the home country is a sufficient form of circumstantial evidence that a Convention ground was a contributing factor to the
risk of being persecuted. There is, however, no requirement that
an applicant for asylum be more at risk than other persons or
groups in his or her country of origin. The relevant question is
instead whether the Convention ground is causally connected to
the applicant's predicament, irrespective of whether other individuals or groups also face a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for the same or a different Convention ground 2

72. Id. 1 15-16.

